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Abstract 
 
In the empirical literature on minimum wage enforcement, the standard approach is to 
measure the number of violations, not their depth.  In this paper we present a family of 
violation indices which, by analogy with poverty indices, can emphasize the depth of 
violation to different degrees.  The standard measure is a special case of this family of 
indices, but other members of the family highlight the depth of violation.  We present an 
application to South Africa to show that the depth of violation matters, and is not captured 
by the standard measure in actual situations. 
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I. Introduction 
 
Developing countries are notorious for poor labour market conditions (Ronconi, 2008).  
While most developing countries have extensive labour regulations and social security 
systems, compliance in the less developed world is generally low (Ronconi, 2008; Strobl & 
Walsh, 2003; Maloney and Nunez, 2003).  There is a growing theoretical and empirical 
literature on the problem of non-compliance with minimum wage laws in developing 
countries (Basu, Chau and Kanbur, 2010; Andalón & Pagés, 2008).  In the empirical 
literature, a standard way of measuring non-compliance is as the fraction of all covered 
workers whose wages are below the minimum.  But this measure does not distinguish 
between different degrees of violation—for example, a wage just below the minimum is 
counted the same as a wage at one third of the minimum, surely an inexact way to measure 
a violation of regulation.  In Section II this paper proposes a family of minimum wage 
violation indices which addressees this problem by appealing to the analogy with poverty 
indices.  Section III applies these indices to South Africa and shows that the depth of 
violation matters.  Section IV concludes. 
 
II. A Family of Violation Indices 
 
In the enforcement literature, non-compliance is generally measured as the fraction of all 
covered workers whose wages fall below the minimum.  However, this method of 
measuring compliance does not distinguish between different degrees of violation.  For 
example, a wage just below the minimum is equivalent in violation to a wage at one third 
of the minimum.  We propose here an index of violation to capture both the number of 
wage earners falling below the minimum and also how far below the minimum they fall.  
 
Consider a distribution of actual wages )(wF with density function )(wf , and an official 
minimum wage mw . If there is full compliance, strictly speaking, we should not see any 
wages at all below mw .  Since those who would otherwise pay wages below mw have no 
reason to pay above mw compliance means paying a wage mw , and non-compliance is 
paying a wage strictly less than mw .  We define the measure of individual violation as 
 
( , )mv v w w=           (1) 
 
where v  is positive if and only if w  is strictly less than mw , and zero if w  is equal to or 
greater than mw .  When w  is strictly less than mw , v  is weakly decreasing in w  and weakly 
increasing in mw .  A particular functional form which satisfies these properties is 
 
( )
( , )
m
m
m
w w
v w w
w
α
 −
 = =
  
        (2) 
 
for α greater than or equal to zero. In fact, when 0=α , v  becomes an indicator function, 
taking on the value 1 when w  is strictly less than mw , and a value of 0 when w  is greater 
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than or equal to mw .  When 1=α , v  is the gap between the actual wage and the official 
minimum wage, expressed as a fraction of the minimum wage.  For values of α  greater 
than 1, the violation function emphasizes large gaps more—a particular value of interest in 
empirical application will be 2=α  which simply squares the gap to produce a measure of 
the violation. 
 
Having specified a measure of violation for an individual wage, the issue now is how to 
aggregate these individual violations, and how to normalize this aggregation.  A 
straightforward method would be to simply take the expectation of ()v over the entire wage 
distribution, defining overall violation V as: 
 
V= E {v(wm ,w)}         (3) 
 
with ),( wwv m  defined as (2) above, V  becomes 
 
( )m
m
w w
V E
w
α  −  =  
    
        (4) 
 
This will be recognized immediately as the analogue of the Foster, Greer and Thorbecke 
(1984), “FGT” measure of poverty, with mw  acting as the poverty line and w as the income.  
In the poverty context, a higher α  captures greater “poverty aversion.”  In our context, 
higher α  similarly captures “violation aversion”, emphasizing greater weight given to the 
worst violations.  What difference is made by different degrees of violation aversion is an 
empirical question.  We turn now to an application of the new measures of minimum wage 
violation to South Africa. 
 
III. Application to South Africa 
 
The minimum wage debate is central to South African policy discourse.  A detailed account 
of South African minimum wage institutions, and the relevant data sources for measuring 
violation, is provided in Bhorat, Kanbur and Mayet (2010).  The Employment Conditions 
Commission (ECC) is a representative body within the Department of Labour (DoL) which 
advises the Minister of Labour on sectoral wage minima.  The DoL uses a team of labour 
inspectors whose job is to enforce compliance with these sectoral determinations. There are 
11 different sectoral determinations set by the ECC.1
                                                 
1 Specifically  Forestry, Agriculture, Contract Cleaning, Children in the Performance of Advertising, Artistic 
and Cultural Activities (under fifteen years of age), Taxi Operators, Civil Engineering, Learnerships, Private 
Security, Domestic Workers, Wholesale and Retails, and Hospitality 
 In this note we will focus on 9 of 
these sectors.  The minima are further differentiated for some sectors by geographical area 
(urban-A; semi-urban-B and rural-C), and are regularly updated for inflation.  For data on 
wages in South Africa we use the September Labour Force Survey (LFS) data for 2007.  
The sectoral and occupational codes in these data are matched with the gazetted minimum 
wages for different sectors to gauge the violation in each of the 9 sectors.  A detailed 
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discussion of this data source is provided in Bhorat, Kanbur and Mayet (2010).2
α
  The 
estimates for V with = 0, 1 and 2, denoted V0, V1 and V2, are given in Table 1.  Whilst V0 
measures the percentage of workers violated, that is, earning below the minimum, the ratio 
(V1/V0) allows for the interpretation of V1, since it denotes the percentage shortfall of the 
average wage of violated workers from the minimum wage.  Put differently, violated 
workers in this sample are earning on average (V1/V0) below the relevant minima.  
 
Table 1:  Estimates of the Index of Violation, 2007 
 
Sectoral Determination Index of Violation 
 V0 V1 V2 V1/V0 
Retail and Wholesale  0.39 0.14 0.07 0.36 
Domestic Workers 0.39 0.13 0.06 0.33 
Farm Workers 0.55 0.17 0.07 0.31 
Forestry Workers 0.53 0.16 0.07 0.30 
Taxi Operators 0.47 0.18 0.09 0.38 
Security Workers 0.67 0.28 0.14 0.42 
Hospitality Workers 0.29 0.10 0.05 0.34 
Contract Cleaners 0.44 0.16 0.08 0.36 
Civil Engineering  0.09 0.04 0.02 0.44 
Total 0.45 0.16 0.08 0.36 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using LFS September 2007 (StatsSA) and ECC sectoral 
determinations.   
 
The estimates in the last row of Table 1 show that in 2007 45% of employees were 
receiving sub-minimum wages.  The violation rate varies from 67% for Security Workers 
to 9% for employees in civil engineering.  But is the depth of violation uniform across 
these sectors?  Table 2 suggests that it is not.  In this Table the estimates for the three 
indices have been ranked, with a rank of 1 denoting the highest rate of violation.  It can be 
seen that while the ranks are related, they are not perfectly correlated.  For example, 
comparing V0  and V2, Forestry Workers change rank from 3 to 6, Farm Workers change 
from 2 to 4, whilst taxi operators switch from being ranked 4th with V0 to being 2nd with V2. 
 
  
                                                 
2 The detailed paper also discusses how we use the 2000 Income Expenditure Survey (IES) to match 
geographical areas in the LFS to the geographical areas in minimum wage determinations. 
 5 
Table 2: Rank of the Index of Violation, 2007 
 
Sectoral Determination Index of Violation 
 V0 V1 V2 
Retail and Wholesale  6 6 5 
Domestic Workers 7 7 7 
Farm Workers 2 3 4 
Forestry Workers 3 4 6 
Taxi Operators 4 2 2 
Security Workers 1 1 1 
Hospitality Workers 8 8 8 
Contract Cleaners 5 5 3 
Civil engineering  9 9 9 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using LFS September 2001 and 2007 (StatsSA) and ECC 
sectoral determinations.   
 
These descriptions of rank changes are confirmed in Table 3. In 2007, the correlations 
between V0, V1, and V2 are all high, but not perfect—the lowest value is around 77%.  The 
high correlation coefficient between the rankings of the depth of violation, V1, and the 
squared depth of violation, V2, (at 0.99) is an unsurprising result, recalling that in the latter 
the individual measure of violation is simply the square of the former.  But note that the 
correlation coefficient between the V0 and the V1 index is higher than that between the V0 
and the V2 index, suggesting that the headcount of violated individuals and the degree of 
violation may be more closely related than the share of violations is with the degree of 
violation squared.  The lower correlation between these two indices may reflect the fact 
that the changes in them are driven by different underlying factors.  When severity of 
violation is strongly emphasized, some sectors stand out more sharply.  The depth of 
violation matters. 
 
Table 3:  Spearman’s Rank Order Correlation Coefficients between Violation Indices, 
2007 
 
 
 Index Coefficient 
V0 and V1  0.8071* 
V0 and V2  0.7667* 
V1 and V2  0.9865* 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using LFS September 2001 and 2007 (StatsSA) and ECC 
sectoral determinations 
Note: * indicates significance at 1%.  
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IV. Conclusion 
 
In the empirical literature on minimum wage enforcement, the standard approach is to 
measure the number of violations, not their depth.  In this paper we present a family of 
violation indices which, by analogy with poverty indices, can emphasize the depth of 
violation to different degrees.  The standard measure, the percentage of covered workers 
earning sub-minimum wages, is a special case of this family of indices, but other members 
of the family highlight the depth of violation.  This family of measures can be estimated 
using the same data that is used to estimate the standard measure of violation.  We have 
presented an application to South Africa to show that the depth of violation matters, and is 
not captured by the standard measure in actual situations.  The new family of indices of 
minimum wage violation can play an important role in the growing literature on minimum 
wage enforcement since they are the first step in a richer causal analysis of what determines 
the patterns of minimum wage violation (Bhorat, Kanbur and Mayet, 2010). 
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